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Locke, Judgment, and Figure:
A Consistent Answer to the Molyneux Problem
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Introduction
Ever since Locke published the ‘Molyneux Problem,’ in his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694), philosophical
discussions surrounding it have been concerned with whether there
are innate cross-modal connections in the mind, or if the mind is
unimodal. A cross-modal connection is where representational
content is shared, or inferred, by two or more sense modalities. Under
a unimodal conception, mental connections between representational
content are thought to occur only after experience. Rationalists have
typically affirmed cross-modal connections in the mind, but
empiricists have denied such a possibility, maintaining that
connections between the various modalities are made only after a
sufficient amount of experience has occurred. For his part, Locke,
agreeing with Molyneux, held the opinion that such connections could
only be known for certain through experience. Many have argued that
Locke, by answering in the affirmative, has put a strain on the
consistency of his epistemology and philosophy of mind.1 In this
essay, I will show that it is within the scope of Locke’s body of work
for him to consistently maintain cross-modal connections are another
faculty of the mind, while the verification of that faculty’s
representational content must be empirically verified to be veridical. I
hope to achieve this by analyzing Locke’s notion and use of
judgment, and paying close attention to how his views on causation
evolved throughout his career.
1

For an excellent overview of the reaction to the Molyneux question, and
Locke’s answer to it, by the early modern philosophers, see: John Davis, “The
Molyneux Problem,” Journal of the History of Ideas 21, no. 3 (1960): 392-408.
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In order to tease out my interpretation of Locke, I will begin with
a layout of the Molyneux problem, providing a historical sketch, and
note some early criticism. Next, I will highlight the pertinent points in
Locke’s philosophy, and then critically examine a recent paper by
Ralph Schumacher in which he claims that Locke’s use of judgment is
untenable given his empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind.
These taken together, I believe, provide the means for a consistent
answer to the Molyneux Problem.
A Historical Sketch
Irish scientist William Molyneux (1656-1698), after reading the
first edition of Locke’s Essay, wrote to Locke, sending his famous
thought experiment. In the Essay, Locke inquired whether a person
born blind, who could by touch distinguish the shape of a sphere from
the shape of a cube, would be able, upon gaining their sight,
distinguish the shapes without touching them?2 Molyneux answered
his question by claiming that although the person has gained the
experience of these shapes by touch, they have yet to gain the
experience of how their touch affects their sight. In other words,
according to Molyneux, the cognitive mechanism needed to associate
the mental content gained from the modality of sight with the content
gained from touch is created by experience. Conversely, if the
identification were to be made upon sight, the cognitive mechanism
would be innate. Epistemically, this boils down to the prior claiming
the distinction can only be known through experience, while the latter
claims it can be made known through reason.
John Locke inserted Molyneux’s thought experiment in the
second edition of the Essay, where it remained through each
subsequent edition. Locke agreed with Molyneux’s answer, claiming
that at first sight the person would not be able to say for certain which
shape was which, though they could name them by touch. Locke
supports this claim by appealing to an act of judgment which through

2
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H.
Nidditch (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), II.ix.8. All references to the
Essay will cite Peter H. Nidditch’s 1979 edition in the order of book, chapter, and
section.
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custom seems to convert the visual input of a two-dimensional figure
into a three-dimensional figure.3
Bishop George Berkeley (1685-1753) was one of the first to
insist the need to abandon the doctrine of common sensibles in order
to justify a negative answer. Descartes and Locke were largely
credited with rediscovering the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities from Aristotle, who had distinguished between
common sensibles and proper sensibles.4
Under the heading of common sensibles are qualities such as
extension, figure, motion, rest, and number. The proper sensibles, on
the other hand, include the sensations of color, sound, taste, and
temperature. It is clear Locke is committed to this distinction when he
lists extension, figure, motion, and rest as ideas we get from both
seeing and feeling.5 With this in mind, Berkeley argued that if the
figure of an object perceived by touch is the same figure perceived by
sight, then nothing new is introduced in one’s mind.6 That is to say, if
there is a cross-modal connection, at least relative to figure, then
Locke and Molyneux are supposedly wrong.7 Consequently, Berkeley
defended a heterogeneous thesis where the representational ideas
conveyed by the senses are peculiar to each individual sense. Vision
for Berkeley was like a language with an arbitrary connection
between the signs and what they stand in for.8
I propose that Locke held there are two ways of accessing the
idea of three-dimensional figure. One we receive from bodies through
the relation of resemblance, and the other through perceiving colors
causally. The prior is a representation of figure as the genuine article,
with the latter just appearing as figure—which I will henceforth call
3

Ibid., II.ix.8.
Aristotle, De Anima, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin
Classics, 1986), 189-191: 425a-b.
5
Essay, II.v.
6
Geogre Berkeley, A New Theory of Vision (London: Aldine Press, 1969), 7475.
7
I will argue below that Locke differed with Molynuex in justifying his
negative answer.
8
Margaret Atherton, "Berkeley's Theory of Vision and Its Reception," in The
Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler (New York:
Cambridge Press, 2005), 97.
4
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zigure. In order to draw out this distinction, more needs to be said
about Locke’s divide between ideas of primary and secondary quality,
and how they are conveyed to the mind.
Ideas of Primary and Secondary Quality
Locke distinguishes primary qualities as those that are
inseparable from a body. Of the primary qualities found in bodies,
Locke lists: solidity, extension, figure, mobility, motion or rest,
number, bulk, texture, motion, size, and situation. Locke claims that
such qualities are found by the senses in every perceivable bulk of
matter, and that the mind finds them in every particular particle.9 This
notion is attested by considering Locke’s example of the division of a
grain of wheat.10 Locke seeks to show that one can continue to divide
an object conceptually, even when they cannot physically divide it
any longer, yet whatever remains will be conceived of as having
primary qualities.
Locke describes secondary qualities as powers possessed by
particular particles of matter to bring about ideas in a perceiver.11 He
holds secondary qualities as separable from bodies, and as ones that
do not resemble bodies as they are in-themselves. Michael Jacovides
explains, concluding from Locke’s wheat example, that although it
can be known by reason that the minute pieces of flour retain their
primary qualities, none of the ideas of primary quality are conveyed
to perceivers. This is precisely because those bits of matter do not
have powers to produce ideas of primary qualities, or else they would
be perceived.12 Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are the powers
of certain particles of matter that produce ideas in us. For example,
the idea of the whiteness of the flour is conveyed to us by particles,
which possess primary qualities, yet have the additional property of a
power to bring about an idea of whiteness in a perceiver. Locke says
9

Essay, II.viii.9.
Ibid., II.viii.9.
11
Ibid., II.viii.10.
12
Michael Jacovides, "Locke's Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary
Qualities," in The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human
Understanding", ed. Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
116.
10
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manna has, in addition to the primary qualities, the power to cause
sickness in us, but the sickness is not ‘in’ the manna, it is ‘in’ us.13
Consequently, Locke thinks of secondary qualities as separable from
bodies. Locke explicitly says ideas of secondary qualities are not
really ‘in’ the objects—like ideas of primary quality—but are features
of an object’s primary qualities.14
Locke maintains ideas of secondary quality are only represented
as effects of their causes, and this relationship is insufficient to
represent ideas of primary quality like figure. Thus, Locke chose the
relation of resemblance to convey the representation of ideas of
primary quality. Representation by way of resemblance occurs in the
mind as images.15 Jacovides explains that the idea of figure is really
an image of figure, and an image is any mental content of which you
can draw a picture.16
Thomas Lennon, commenting on Locke’s theory of
representation, echoes Jacovides in maintaining that Locke denies that
secondary qualities represent by resemblance as being crucial for his
advancing of the corpuscularian theory of substance.17 On the
corpuscularian theory, substances consist of primary qualities, such as
figure, motion, size, etc., and secondary qualities subsist on the
primary ones. Lennon interprets Locke as holding that ideas of
secondary quality, like whiteness, represent and accurately correspond
to the unit(s) in the substructure of an object, but not the structure of
the object itself.18 Thus, Locke holds that particles of imperceptible
bulk, relative to the modalities of sight and touch, impinge on us in a
causal relationship to convey ideas of secondary quality. These ideas
are mere effects of their causes. Ideas of primary quality, on the other
hand, are conveyed by resemblance.

13

Essay, II.viii.18.
Ibid., II.viii.10.
15
Ibid., II.xi.17; III.iii.7.
16
Michael Jacovides, "Locke's Resemblance Thesis," The Philosophical
Review 108, no. 4 (1999): 467.
17
Thomas M. Lennon, "Locke on Ideas and Representation," in The
Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," ed.
Lex Newman (New York: Cambridge Press, 2007), 247.
18
Ibid., 249.
14
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There are broadly two interpretations of how Locke might think
primary qualities are conveyed to the mind. Both interpretations agree
that Locke comes to admit that the explanatory scope of
corpuscularian mechanism is limited in some fashion. The
disagreement is whether this limitation should be conceived of
epistemically, or metaphysically. One major intersection of contention
comes from Locke’s letter to Stillingfleet. In it, Locke backs away
from the claim that all bodies interact by impulse, but also remarks
that he can yet conceive of another way they could interact. Locke
goes on to mention that he has been persuaded by Newton’s
Principia, not to presume to limit God’s power by putting into bodies
‘powers and operations’ beyond what we can explain by matter.19
For the purpose of this essay, I am not daring to venture an
account of how the connection through resemblance is made. E. M.
Curley has flatly stated Locke has no ‘general thesis’ of the
perception of primary qualities.20 It will suffice for my purposes that
at least he holds that they can be conveyed, and in a different manner
than the ideas secondary qualities are—whether ultimately in some
alternative causal manner, or by God’s active will.
On my interpretation, the idea of figure can be received two ways
simultaneously and coextensively with one another. First, twodimensional figures are received causally via colors which, through
an act of judgment, appear as three-dimensional zigure. However,
through the relation of resemblance, figure is represented as the
genuine article. Consequently, Molyneux’s patient would have to
touch the object to be certain whether the figure perceived was not
merely zigure. To further tease out this interpretation and in particular
how Locke, by positing two kinds figure, can maintain a passive
judgment and thereby remain faithful to his empiricist predilections,
we will need to examine how he conceives of an act of judgment.

19

John Locke, The Works of John Locke (London: Strahan, 1777), 561.
E. M. Curley, "Locke, Boyle, and the Distinction Between Primary and
Secondary Qualities," Philosophical Review 81, no. 4 (1972): 459.
20
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Judgment for Locke
David Owen explains Locke’s view on judgment as analogous to
his explanation of knowledge.21 For Locke, knowledge is the
perception of the agreement or disagreement between ideas.22 Locke
lists four ways how ideas can agree or disagree: identity or diversity,
relation, co-existence or necessary connection, and real existence. 23
Locke, then, offers three ways how these agreements (or
disagreements) are perceived: intuitively, by demonstration, or
through the senses.24 Locke gives the example of knowledge of our
own existence by intuition, the existence of God by demonstration,
and of external things by sensation.25 Judgment follows the same
course as knowledge, except there is not a perception of an agreement
or disagreement between ideas, only the presumption of one or the
other.26 This is precisely why Locke takes the presumption of zigure
as mere ‘mark’ of figure, and he explicitly says judgments are quick
to be mistaken as perception.
Abandon Common Sensibles, or Judgment?
In Ralph Schumacher’s essay, What Are The Direct Objects Of
Sight?, he insists that positing judgment to perceive figure would
undermine Locke’s empiricist epistemology. As a good empiricist,
Locke holds that all simple ideas are received passively by the mind.
Locke compares the mind to a mirror, unable to refuse simple ideas
whether we want them or not.27 Locke explains ideas are immediate
objects of perception, thought, or understanding.28
Vere Chappell notes that Locke uses the term idea
indiscriminately, while those before him had used different names for

21

David Owen, "Locke on Judgment," in Cambridge Companion to Locke's
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Lex Newman (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 406.
22
Essay, IV.i.2.
23
Ibid., IV.i.3.
24
Owen, “Locke on Judgment,” 410.
25
Essay, IV.ix.2.
26
Owen, “Locke on Judgment,” 410; Cf. Essay, IV.xiv.4.
27
Ibid., II.i.25.
28
Ibid., II.viii.8.
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different designations.29 Therefore, a lot of confusion has arisen in
discussing Locke’s use of ideas, but what is clear is that they come in
two flavors: simple and complex.
Simple ideas for Locke either have a uniform appearance, or
while being reflected upon in the mind, cannot be conceived to break
down into other ideas.30 Chappell suggests Locke defines simple ideas
in two sorts of ways, phenomenally and logically. If an idea is
perceived as a unity with no division in it, it is phenomenally simple,
whereas if an idea cannot be thought of as containing another idea, it
is logically simple.31 Locke often invokes ideas of secondary
qualities—or the proper sensibles—as prime examples of simple
ideas. In addition to simple ideas, Locke also holds that there are
complex ideas, which are also passively received. Chappell explains,
for Locke, ideas we acquire from sensation or reflection are the
products of compounding simple ideas. Ultimately, for Locke all the
ideas we have can be abstracted in reverse to simple ideas, which we
passively receive.
Schumacher agrees with all the above regarding the passivity of
receiving simple ideas. Therefore, he argues that since the passivity of
the mind ensures for Locke that simple ideas are reliable signs of their
external cause, any causal action by the mind—like judgment—in the
reception of these simple ideas would cast aside the reliability of their
cause.32 Schumacher then contends, rightly, that Locke rejects innate
ideas of the mind. Any ideas produced by the mind are complex ideas
made out of simple ones. Thus, the Lockean mind cannot comprise
the simple idea of figure out of the simple ideas of colors. No simple
ideas can be created out of other simple ideas. With this in mind,
Schumacher explains that if Locke’s use of the word ‘form,’ as an
action of a judgment, is to be taken to mean ‘alter’ or ‘change,’ then
several difficulties arise.33 The first is an altered idea cannot be a
29

Vere Chappell, "Locke's Theory of Ideas," in The Cambridge Companion to
Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York: Cambridge Press, 1999), 28.
30
Essay, II.ii.1.
31
Chappell, “Locke’s Theory of Ideas,” 36.
32
Ralph Schumacher, "What Are the Direct Objects of Sight?," Locke Studies
3 (2003): 55.
33
Essay, II.ix.9.
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simple idea because part of the definition is simple ideas cannot be
altered. The second is that Schumacher thinks it is difficult to
conceive of the visual idea of figure as composed of various colors,
since simple ideas have a uniform appearance. Lastly, since Locke
says this visual idea of figure is different from all other visual ideas,
Schumacher reasons Locke takes ‘form’ to mean ‘produce,’ which
would clearly be in conflict with Locke’s empiricism. 34 Schumacher
concludes that while Locke’s use of judgment makes his negative
answer to Molyneux intelligible, it runs afoul central claims of his
empiricist epistemology, and it is for those coherence reasons that it
should be jettisoned. Moreover, Locke should have given a positive
answer to Molyneux given his commitments to the common sensibles
and that figure is a primary quality that resembles.35
I agree with much of Schumacher’s view. We agree that Locke
cannot say figure is a simple idea while it is composed of other simple
ideas like color. However, I disagree that Locke takes the act of
judgment to actually ‘produce’ the simple idea of figure. He
specifically says that it takes the ‘mark’ of figure. On my account—
which I will explain below—the idea of zigure that arises from the
judgment occurs from the presumed agreement of ideas in the mind.
That is to say, Molyneux’s patient presumes the idea of a twodimensional figure, variously shaded, agrees with the idea of figure
received by resemblance.
A Novel Interpretation
I will now weave together the core details above into a coherent
account, resulting in an answer to the Molyneux question that allows
Locke to adhere to his various philosophical doctrines. By my lights,
Molyneux’s patient, upon regaining their sight and viewing the
sphere, would see a variously shaded two-dimensional circle
contemporaneously, as they perceived a three-dimensional figure. The
idea of the two-dimensional circle is causally conveyed to a person,
while the representational content of figure, originally conveyed via
the modality of touch, via resemblance, would also be presented.

34
35

Schumacher, “What are the direct objects of sight?,” 56.
Ibid., 58.
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Presumably, the idea of three-dimensional figure would be
colorless in its representation, since color is peculiar to the modality
of sight. Perhaps ideas of primary quality represent in the mind as in
Flemish painting, with multiple points of view, being perceived by
someone suffering from complete achromatopsia. Regardless of how
an object is represented through resemblance, it seems reasonable to
assume it would scarcely be taken noticed of relative to the colors that
enshroud the surface on an object. In the same way, with the modality
of touch, the simple idea of heat searing ones flesh would take the
lion’s share of one’s attention, rather than shape of the hot rock felt.
The role of judgment, collecting the various colors in the idea of
a circle forming an idea of three-dimensional zigure, I take as entirely
passive. On my view, the idea of two-dimensional figure is presumed
to agree with the idea of three-dimensional figure, thus passing off the
appearance of zigure. It is strongly suggested Locke may have
thought it was possible for someone to presume the agreement
without the aid of touch. But they would not be able to know for
certain until the object was touched.
This claim is consistent with Locke’s wording in response to
Molyneux. Locke seems to agree with Molyneux’s answer, but not
necessarily with all of his reasoning. Locke explicitly states he agrees
with this thinking man, not the thinking of the man. Furthermore,
Locke says that at first a person would not be able to say for certain
which was which, but could unmistakably name them via touch.36
It is helpful to note that Locke composed most of his essay while
in Holland during exile. During his stay, he frequented many art
galleries.37 Locke explained that someone unskilled in painting would
not believe there were no ‘protuberances’ in the images they saw,
unless they touched the painting. An interesting point about judgment
can be taken from this. The person viewing the painting could not be
certain that they did not perceive ideas of primary qualities in the
shapes of the objects, since the judgment presumed falsely an
agreement between ideas of secondary quality of two-dimensional
shapes with those of primary qualities. This is precisely why Locke
36

Essay, II.ix.8.
Michael Jacovides, "Locke and the Visual Array," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 85, no.1 (2012): 77-78.
37
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takes ideas of secondary quality, such as colors, only to represent their
causes, but not bodies.
Concluding Remarks
What I have endeavored to show is that Locke need not abandon
his doctrine of common sensibles, or the resemblance of ideas of
primary quality, or posit an overactive judgment to remain consistent
in his answer to Molyneux. I take it within the scope of Locke’s
philosophy that visual input taken from colors is received twodimensionally, and that we passively judge it to agree with our ideas
of three-dimensional figure received by resemblance. In other words,
it is within the pale of Locke’s philosophy to hold that there is an
innate cross-modal faculty for representational content of ideas of
primary quality, but this content needs to be empirically verified. This
interpretation relies heavily on two theses. The first is that Locke held
there was kind of figure, which I have referred to as zigure. The
second, and likely more controversial claim, is that Locke came to
believe that the mechanical philosophy of his day either could not
epistemically account for the interaction of some bodies, or that it
could not metaphysically account for this interaction. Consequently,
this results in an epistemic distinction between objects encountered at
the phenomenal level—those things that lend themselves to being
empirically verified by two or more senses, and those objects at the
sub-phenomenal level—accessible through only one sense modality.
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